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Secrecy, Intimacy, and W orkable Rules: Justice
Sotomayor Stakes Out the Middle Ground in United
States v. Jones
Miriam H. Baer
In this Essay, Professor Miriam Baerfocuses on Justice Sotomayor's concurrence
in United States v. Jones, which has attracted widespread notice due to Justice
Sotomayor's suggestion that the Court reconsider its reasonableexpectation ofprivacy
test and the related third-party doctrine. Professor Baer argues that Justice
Sotomayor's opinion exemplifies an attempt to stake out a "middle ground" approach
to Fourth Amendment debates over surveillance and technology, one which
foregrounds intimacy and common-sense rules as guidingprinciples.
One can hardly consider criminal procedure without contemplating the
Fourth Amendment's reasonable expectation of privacy test and its partner in
crime, the third-party doctrine. These doctrines work in tandem to strip an
individual of Fourth Amendment protection she might otherwise claim over
the information she "knowingly exposes to the public."' Over the past half
century, the two doctrines have enabled the government to develop and
undertake a broad variety of investigative techniques with virtually no judicial
oversight. Not surprisingly, both doctrines increasingly have come under
attack as rapidly changing technology renders surveillance cheaper and more
*
*
2
invasive.'
The Supreme Court recently reflected these surveillance-related concerns in
its resolution of United States v. Jones.' Prosecutors may ruefully recall Jones as
the case that should never have been. A joint task force investigating narcotics
activity placed a global positioning system device (GPS) on the undercarriage
of a car and used it to track the car and its driver's movements for twenty-eight

1.
2.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REv. 101

(2008)

(decrying Fourth

Amendment jurisprudence's doctrinal obsession with declaring what is and is not an
invasion of "privacy" deserving of Fourth Amendment protection); Daniel J. Solove, Fourth
Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REv. 1511, 1521 (2010) (declaring the reasonable
expectation of privacy test "doomed" and deserving of abandonment).
3.

1 3 2 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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days. 4 Ironically, the officers investigating the case already had probable cause
to believe the car was being used for illegal activity; they had secured a warrant
to place the GPS on the car and monitor its movements.s But they violated the
terms of the warrant by acting outside its geographic and temporal limits.'
Conceding that they had violated the warrant, the police invoked their fallback
argument that no warrant was required in the first place. Nine Justices
disagreed.
The majority opinion that disposed of Jones' case is narrow; writing for
five members of the Court, Justice Scalia concludes that the attachment of the
GPS constitutes a "search" because it physically intrudes upon the defendant's
"effects," namely his car.7 The opinion thus revives the property-based
definition of Fourth Amendment searches and effectively discards previous
holdings that had severed the connection between a Fourth Amendment
"search" and local property law.' Despite this jurisprudential development, the
majority's opinion bears far less potential significance for law enforcement
agencies than the two concurrences in the case -one penned solely by Justice
Sotomayor, and the other authored by Justice Alito and joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan. 9
Justice Alito's opinion, which concurs only in the judgment, sounds far
more like a dissent."o Criticizing the majority for its originalist approach,"
Justice Alito's opinion embraces the mosaic theory that emerged in Judge
Ginsburg's appellate decision below: however proper warrantless monitoring
of a single trip through public streets may be, that propriety disappears when
the monitoring becomes a four week dragnet.1 2 in other words, the sum of the

4.

Id. at 948.

5.

Id.

6.

Id.

7.

Id. at 949. The car was in fact owned in the defendant's wife's name, but this was not of
import to the majority.

8.

See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.

170, 183-84 (1984);

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,

353 (1967).

J.,

J.,

9.

Jones, 132

10.

See, e.g., id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the majority opinion as
"highly artificial" and "strain[ing] the language of the Fourth Amendment"). As one
observer quipped, Alito "spent more ink criticizing the majority than analyzing the case."
Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the FourthAmendment Third Party
Doctrine, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 431,452 (2013).

ii.

Jones, 13 2 S. Ct. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[1It is almost impossible to
think of late-18th-century situations that are analogous to what took place in this case.").

12.

Id. at 964 ("We need not identify with precision the point at which the tracking of this
vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the 4-week mark.").
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S. Ct. at 954-57 (Sotomayor,
the judgment).

concurring); id. at 957-64 (Alito,

concurring in
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government's monitoring activity can become a Fourth Amendment search,
even if its component parts do not."
Justice Sotomayor's opinion, in which she concurs with the majority but
simultaneously endorses some of Justice Alito's reasoning, reveals much about
the Fourth Amendment's possible evolution. Despite its brevity and its sole
authorship, Justice Sotomayor's concurrence has already been cited numerous
times by scholars and lower courts." A Harvard Law Review comment
analyzing the case strongly praises Justice Sotomayor's opinion as "offering
ideas for reform and preserving a full doctrinal toolkit for posterity."s
While agreeing with Justice Scalia's majority opinion that the government
had "usurped Jones' property for the purpose of conducting surveillance on
him," Justice Sotomayor opines that future government actions could very well
intrude upon privacy, "even in the absence of a trespass."" She then goes on to
consider how the Fourth Amendment's reasonable expectation of privacy test
(articulated nearly fifty years ago in Katz v. United States17 ) can best take into
account changes wrought by technology-and, in doing so, bluntly questions
the continuing viability of a doctrine that leaves evidence held by third parties
unprotected by the Fourth Amendment." Thus, in fewer than ten paragraphs,
Justice Sotomayor questions and reframes two of the oldest and most criticized
doctrines in modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.1 9
Commendably, Justice Sotomayor's opinion stops short of creating the
drastic change in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that some scholars seek.20

13.

Justice

14.

A search on February 7, 2014, for "sotomayor /p Jones /p concur!" through WestlawNext
yielded over 212 citations in the "Journals and Law Reviews" (JLR) library and over 70
citations in the "Allcases" (federal and state courts) library.

15.

Case Comment, Search and GPS Surveillance, 126 HARv. L. REV.

Alito's analysis embraced the approach taken by Judge Ginsburg in the D.C. Circuit
opinion below. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F. 3 d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), affd sub
nom. United States v. Jones, 1 3 2 S. Ct. 945 (2012); see also Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of
the FourthAmendment, in1 MICH. L. REV. 311, 313 (2012) (labeling Justice Alito's concurrence
an example of the mosaic approach).

16. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (Sotomayor,

J., concurring).

389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)18. Jones, 1 3 2 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor,

J.,

226, 226 (2012).

17.

concurring).

ig.

See Orin S. Kerr, The Casefor the Third-PartyDoctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563-64 (2009)
(summarizing critiques of the third-party doctrine); Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most
of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation ofMosaic Theory,
8 DuKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 9-16 (2012) (surveying weaknesses in current Fourth
Amendment privacy doctrines).

20.

See, e.g., Paul Ohm, The FourthAmendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 Miss. L.J. 1309,
1336 (2012) (declaring that "the age of using privacy as a measuring stick for Fourth
Amendment protection is likely soon to draw to a close"); Solove, supra note 2, at 1511-15
(2010) (arguing that the Court should replace the reasonable expectation of privacy test with
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Her concurrence poses a series of difficult questions, but stops short of
definitively resolving them. Nevertheless, if one looks closely enough, one can
find within Justice Sotomayor's opinion a more plausible conception of Fourth
Amendment privacy and a useful framework to implement it.
Crafted with an eye towards devising workable pragmatic rules, Justice
Sotomayor's discussion of GPS monitoring's attributes offers a template for
deciding future cases. On a superficial level, her opinion states simply why
certain law enforcement activities invoke the average citizen's concern. On a
much deeper level, her observations form the core of a framework that can be
employed to distinguish future "searches" from non-searches. More useful to
courts and law enforcement agents than Justice Alito's declaration that four
weeks of real-time surveillance transgresses some imaginary boundary, Justice
Sotomayor's opinion begins the hard work of accommodating society's need
for effective law enforcement and its conflicting concern with preserving
privacy in an increasingly sophisticated technological world.
The need for pragmatic, workable rules becomes particularly salient when
one considers the category of misconduct known as white-collar crime.
Harmful misconduct such as fraud relies on and is often proven by reference to
information contained in documents, which in turn are often collected and
maintained by third parties. Until now, prosecutors have been able to prove
these types of cases by using a wealth of information obtained via grand jury
and administrative subpoenas, not to mention statutes that impose a variety of
recordkeeping obligations on corporate and commercial institutions.2 1
Accordingly, the adoption of mosaic theory2 2 might well unleash a set of
unintended consequences - not only relating to the continued prosecution of
garden-variety mail frauds, but also for the continuing viability of the modern
administrative state, which relies almost entirely on the collection,

a "coverage" question and a "procedure" question that would make most enforcement
activity fall under the Fourth Amendment's coverage).
21.

For an extensive treatment of the government's power to obtain documents via grand jury
subpoena, as well as statutes mandating the collection of said documents, see CHRISTOPHER
SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEw GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH

AMENDMENT 139-67 (2007), which criticizes the relatively lax standards for securing
information through grand jury subpoena. For an earlier treatment, see Christopher
Slobogin, Subpoenasand Privacy, 54 DEPAuLL. REV. 8o5, 839-41 (2005).
22.
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Although its label implies a single "theory," the mosaic concept lumps two distinct
enforcement problems into the same category. First, sometimes the government acquires
too much information about a single citizen. This is the "depth problem" in Fourth
Amendment analysis, and it was on display in Jones. Second, sometimes the government
collects a relatively shallow amount of information about massive groups of people. This is
the Fourth Amendment's "breadth problem," and it arises out of a number of mass
surveillance practices. Although the two mosaics share certain characteristics, they arise out
of different enforcement aims and often trigger different concerns.
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maintenance, and production of documents, often with little to no
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.
The Supreme Court has long sought to provide ex ante guidance to law
enforcement agents and ex post guidance to trial courts. Whereas the more
expansive notions of mosaic theory threaten interpretive anarchy, 4 Justice
Sotomayor's sober and pragmatic analysis avoids such conceptual uncertainty
and sets in place the beginnings of a framework that may prove valuable for
both those who apply Fourth Amendment principles on the ground and those
who do so from the bench. As a result, one should not be surprised if Justice
Sotomayor's Jones concurrence eventually attains the same recognition as
Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz commanded almost five decades ago.
The remainder of this Essay unfolds as follows. Part I explores historical
precedent by considering Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz,2 5 which
lays the foundation for the reasonable expectation of privacy test, and Harlan's
later dissent in United States v. White,26 wherein he expressed disappointment
with the way his test appeared to unfold. Part II then goes on to consider
Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in Jones. I argue that it is significant because it
conceptualizes privacy not as a form of secrecy, but rather as an expression of
intimacy. Rhetorically asking a series of questions, the opinion then offers a set
of guidelines that courts might utilize in distinguishing between intimate and
non-intimate conduct.
Finally, Part III assesses this framework's usefulness by considering its
application to white-collar crime. Any rollback of either the Katz test or its
related third-party doctrine would seriously constrain the government's ability
to investigate and prosecute document-intensive crimes such as fraud. 7 Some
might conclude that this concern is misplaced or simply irrelevant.2 8 Others,
however, are likely to respond just as strongly that stare decisis matters, and

23.

Professor William Stuntz warned of this clash nearly two decades ago. William J. Stuntz,
Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. ioi6, 1034 (1995).

24.

See, e.g., David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and
Potential of the Mosaic Theory of FourthAmendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381, 402-11
(2013) (outlining doctrinal and conceptual objections to mosaic theory); Kerr, supra note 13,
at 330-31 (analyzing several of the "ambiguities" created by mosaic theory).

25.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359-62 (1967) (Harlan,

26.

401 U.S. 745, 768-95 (1971) (Harlan,

27.

See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 19, at 564 (arguing that protection for "third party" sources would
enable criminals to hide their criminal activity); William J. Stuntz, OJ. Simpson, Bill
Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARv. L. REv. 842, 859-60 (2001)
(explaining that white-collar prosecutions would be stymied if document requests were
served on third parties subject to either reasonable suspicion or probable cause
requirements).

28.

See, e.g., SLOBOGIN, supra note 21, at 164 (concluding that the "impossibility rationale" for

J.,

concurring).

J., dissenting).

keeping the third-party doctrine intact "is not based on reason but on tradition").
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that the Court should be careful not to rewrite the Fourth Amendment in a way
that severely constrains the modern administrative state. Justice Sotomayor's
opinion is useful precisely because it offers an analytical compromise between
these two arguments. To that end, one should not be surprised if Justice
Sotomayor's middle ground approach eventually attracts the support of her
fellow Justices.
1. PRIVACY AS SECRECY

One of the most enduring-and criticized- tests in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence arises out of another Supreme Court concurrence. The
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test - the standard by which courts have
long decided whether a Fourth Amendment "search" has occurred-was
articulated not by Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Katz v. United States,
but by the concurring opinion authored by Justice Harlan.29 Katz held that the
government's placement of a listening and recording device outside a telephone
booth in order to intercept a suspected gambler's bets violated his Fourth
Amendment rights.3 o Prior to Katz, the Court had decided wiretapping cases by
inquiring into whether the conduct violated protected property interests (and,
in particular, whether the government technology intruded upon a particular
structure, such as an apartment or house). * The majority rule did away with
this analysis, concluding that technology-assisted eavesdropping violated the
telephone-caller's rights, regardless of whether the detectaphone was placed
inside or outside the telephone booth from which he placed his call.3 2
While supporting the majority's contention that the Fourth Amendment
"protects people, not places,"" Justice Harlan went a step further by offering
his own two-part test for deciding just how much protection those "people"
deserved. "My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions
is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' 3 4 Although offered
only to clarify his "understanding" of previous cases, Justice Harlan's analysis
quicldy filled the void left by the Court's abandonment of its previous "physical

J., concurring).

29.

Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan,

30.

Id. at 359 (majority opinion).

31.

Id. at 352 ("It is true that the absence of such penetration was at one time thought to
foreclose further Fourth Amendment inquiry." (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 457,464,466 (1928), and Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-36 (1942))).

32.

Id.

33.

Id. at 351.

34-

Id. at 361 (Harlan,
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invasion" and "tangible property" tests."s The reasonable expectation of privacy
test - at least on its face - offered lower courts and government investigators a
memorable and ostensibly simple, two-pronged test that could be applied to
numerous investigative techniques across multiple enforcement contexts.
Moreover, even as the majority opinion denied it was doing so," the test
affirmed the Court's embrace of "privacy" as a constitutional concept, whose
existence extended as far back as the seminal law review article written by
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, in which they had conceptualized privacy
as a legal right and defined it as a "right to be left alone."3 7
All tests have their limitations; Justice Harlan's reasonable expectation of
privacy test was no exception. Since its articulation, many observers (including
authors of numerous Supreme Court dissents) have questioned the test's
descriptive accuracy, " its circularity and subjectivity,39 and its disquieting
normative implications.40
Indeed, four years after issuing his concurring opinion in Katz, Justice
Harlan himself expressed discomfort with his own test in United States v.
White.4 1 White followed a series of cases in which the government had used
either an undercover officer or a cooperating witness to secure information
from an unsuspecting defendant, culminating with the use of a secretly worn

35.

See Jamal Greene, Beyond Lawrence: Metaprivacy and Punishment, 115 YALE L.J. 1862, 1889
(20o6) (observing that, along with Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), the majority
opinion in Katz opened a "doctrinal void" in privacy law). For examples of the Court's

earlier reliance on physical invasion and tangible property, see, for example, On Lee v. United
States, 343 U.S. 747, 753 (1952); Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
36.

Justice Stewart's majority opinion explicitly rejected the effort to engraft upon the Fourth
Amendment "a general constitutional 'right to privacy."' Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.

37.

Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
For discussions of Warren and Brandeis's piece and how it influenced the Court, see
Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 115-18. For a broader analysis of how the piece influenced privacy

law in general, see Daniel

J.

Solove, ConceptualizingPrivacy, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 1087, 1099-

1102 (2002).
38.

See, e.g., Solove, supra note 2, at 1521-23 (contending that Court's application of Katz test is
without an empirical basis).

39.

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) ("The Katz test ... has often been criticized as
circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable."). For an account of the test's circularity
and the Court's ultimately unsuccessful attempt to avoid it, see Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at
1o6-o9.

40. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 55 (1988) (Brennan,

J.,

dissenting) ("In holding that

the warrantless search of Greenwood's trash was consistent with the Fourth Amendment,
the Court paints a grim picture of our society.").
41.

401 U.S. 745, 769 (1971) (Harlan,

J.,

dissenting).
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"wire" to transmit the conversation to the police as it occurred in real time.'
White's plurality opinion effectively placed both tactics-the use of the
undercover informant generally, and the wearing of a transmittal deviceoutside the Fourth Amendment's ambit. Since the defendant had already
assumed the risk his compatriot would report information to the police, he also
accepted the risk that the same turncoat would conspire with the government
to record and transmit their conversations in real time." Society retained no
expectation of privacy in information provided to third parties, be they friend,
foe, or false friend. This proved too much for Harlan, who feared the Court
was "saddling"
society with pernicious expectations
and risks.'
Notwithstanding these and other criticisms, the "assumption of risk" concept
flourished over the next several decades, paving the way for a variety of
procedures that most laymen would be surprised to learn are not "searches."4 5
For most privacy and Fourth Amendment scholars, the Katz test has failed
miserably in protecting the public's privacy.46 Critics ascribe this failure to its
emphasis on secrecy.47 To the extent that individuals fail to conduct their
affairs in secret, they cede any objection to the government's efforts to see,
watch, or hear them.48 In a world that is increasingly networked and dependent
on one's partial disclosure of information to numerous commercial third
parties, the protection once afforded by Katz appears quaint. 49 As Professor

42.

See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206
(1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747

43-

White, 401 U.S. at 751-52.

44-

Id. at 786 (Harlan,

45.

See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (holding that a trained dog sniffing the
exterior of a car does not constitute a search); Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 55-56 (holding that an
analysis of a resident's trash does not constitute a search); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435 (1976) (holding that obtaining bank records does not constitute a search).

46.

See sources cited supra note 2.

47.

Solove, supra note 37, at 1107 ("Privacy is thus viewed as coextensive with the total secrecy of
information.... [M]atters that are no longer completely secret can no longer be private.");
Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipationof FourthAmendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1083, io86 (2002) ("The Court's current conception of privacy is as a form of total
secrecy."); Stuntz, supra note 23, at 1021-22 (arguing that a secrecy norm best explains
Fourth Amendment doctrine and that "privacy-as-secrecy dominates the case law").

48.

See, e.g., Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (citing White, 401 U.S. at 751-52). For the few, somewhat
inconsistent exceptions to this rule, see Henderson, supra note to, at 438-42, which analyzes
five cases in which the Court chose not to apply the third-party doctrine even though "total
secrecy" arguably was lacking.

49.

For a relatively early recognition of this point, see Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman"'s Fourth
Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REv.
1751, 1758-60 (1994), which describes the challenges of respecting privacy in the modern
world.

(1952).
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Daniel Solove observes, life on the grid makes secrecy, and therefore privacy,
all but impossible to secure.so
II. PRIVACY AS INTIMACY

-

As discussed in Part I, Justice Harlan's reasonable expectation of privacy
test in Katz eventually morphed into a dissatisfying secrecy test. As Professor
Orin Kerr has argued in defense of the third-party doctrine, however, it is one
thing to critique a test and quite another to articulate a viable alternative.s1
Despite criticism, the Court has more or less adhered to Katz's formulation,
even as newer and more powerful instruments enable cheaper and more
intrusive surveillance by the police and government agencies.
Jones thus provided the Court with the opportunity to rewrite Katz. As
noted earlier, Judge Ginsburg's opinion for the D.C. Circuit (rendered under a
different caption, United States v. Maynard2 ) invoked the "mosaic theory"according to which the investigative sum is greater than its constituent parts
that has now become the subject of much discussion among Fourth
Amendment scholars. 3 Tracking a person's single journey from point A to
point B may not be a search, Judge Ginsburg explained, but the same could not
be said for the extended, multi-day surveillance of a person's daily activities.54
For Katz's strongest critics, mosaic theory evokes the possibility of erasing
decades of jurisprudence and vastly transforming the Fourth Amendment's
reach. 5 The theory has a number of drawbacks, however, as Jones itself
illustrates.s" It does not easily guide future courts or enforcement agents in
determining when GPS-assisted surveillance has triggered the Fourth
Amendment's various procedural requirements. Rather, it leaves the
government guessing whether it has gone too far.
Justice Sotomayor's concurrence improves upon the mosaic theory in two
respects. First, she anchors her opinion in an alternate conception of privacy,

5o.

As Solove notes, "life in modern society demands that we enter into numerous relationships
with professionals . . ., businesses . . ., merchants . . ., publishing companies . . .,
organizations . . ., financial institutions .
landlords, employers, and other entities."
Solove, supra note 47, at 1089.

51.

Kerr, supra note 19, at 583 (" [J]f it takes a theory to beat a theory, then surely it takes a
doctrine to beat a doctrine. And it turns out to be quite difficult to devise a replacement for
the third-party doctrine . . . ").

52.

615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 201o).

53.

See David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REv. 62
(2013); Kerr, supra note 13; Slobogin, supra note 19.

54. Maynard, 615 F. 3d at 565.
55.

See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 19.

56.

For a carefil and exhaustive critique, see Kerr, supra note 13, at 328-36.
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conceptualizing it in terms of intimacy rather than secrecy. Second, she lays the
groundwork for a multi-pronged test that lower courts might use in deciding
what government activity is or is not a Fourth Amendment search.
Throughout her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor poses a series of questions
that a hypothetical trial court judge might ask when reviewing a particular type
of enforcement activity. In doing so, she queries "whether people reasonably
expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that
enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and
religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on."s7 Thus, the problem with GPS
monitoring is that it discloses highly intimate information. Later, Justice
Sotomayor muses that it may be time for "our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence [to] cease[] to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy."s" She
then follows up by stating, "I would not assume that all information
voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for
that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection."5
Justice Sotomayor's discussion shifts the definition of Fourth Amendment
"privacy" away from secrecy and instead toward intimacy. The definition of
this abstract idea lies far beyond the scope of this Essay."o As used by Justice
Sotomayor, however, the term "intimacy" appears to refer both to intimate
relationships and to some notion of bodily integrity." This conception, though
it has been criticized by scholars as either too narrow or overly abstract,6 2
57.

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor,

58.

Id. at 957.

J., concurring).

59. Id.
6o. For philosophical treatments of intimacy and its interaction with privacy, see, for example,
JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 86-87 (1992) (arguing that intimacy

derives value from an agent's "love, care, or liking"); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475,
490 (1968) (arguing that electronic monitoring, "in depriving one of privacy, destroys the
possibility of bestowing the gift of intimacy, and makes impossible the essential dimension
of love and friendship").
61.

For extended analyses of constitutional privacy and intimacy, see Heidi Reamer Anderson,
Plotting Privacy as Intimacy, 46 IND. L. REv. 311 (2013). Reamer "plots" intimacy across two
dimensions, one "spatial" and the other "bodily." Id. at 316-21. Professor Solove cites and
discusses a number of philosophers who have equated privacy with a protection of intimate
relationships, see Solove, supra note 37, at 1121-24, as well as accounts of privacy as control
over personhood, id. at 1116-19, and control over one's personal information, id. 1109-15. As
used by Justice Sotomayor, the "substantial quantum of intimate information" phrase likely
touches on all of these concepts. See, e.g.,Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(GPS monitoring conveys a "wealth of detail" regarding a person's "familial, political,
professional, religious and sexual associations"); id. at 957 (raising concern that online
purchases reveal information such as the medications one takes).

62.

Solove, supra note 37, at 1124 (concluding that "privacy as intimacy" is either too broad or
too narrow depending on how the abstract concept is defined). Solove prefers to
conceptualize privacy not as a single abstract idea, but rather as a constellation of
overlapping and related concepts. Id. at 1126-27 (advocating a "pragmatic approach").
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represents a normative and descriptive improvement over Katz's privacy-assecrecy conception. First, it offers more stable protection in a dynamic world.
As technology changes, our shared understanding of what is and is not
intimate is more stable than our understanding of what is and is not "secret."
Second, "privacy as intimacy" better explains some of the Court's prior
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, such as the protection that is afforded to
the curtilage of a home but not to the open field. 6 An emphasis on protecting
intimacy provides a solid justification for the home's status as "first among
equals" in Fourth Amendment analysis. 64 The home is the singular location in
which we are most likely to engage in intimate activities. 6s A rule that protects
the home prophylactically protects intimacy.
Outside the home, the protected veil of intimacy is more difficult to
locate.6 7 It is wrong to say we cast off that veil whenever we act outside the
home, but it is equally wrong to say that we retain it in the same manner.
Dichotomous, categorical approaches (public versus private, workplace versus
"personal," metadata versus content) tend not to work very well. 8 We thus
find ourselves in need of an analytical tool to distinguish protected intimacy
from unprotectedintimacy.
Justice Sotomayor's opinion contains the beginnings of such a framework.
In explaining the problems with GPS monitoring, she observes that it
generates a "precise, comprehensive record" of the person's public movements,
which in turn convey intimate information such as her "familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations." 69 Embedded in these
observations are the components for a test that separates "intrusions on
intimacy" - and therefore "searches" - from ordinary public observations - and

therefore non-searches. Thus, going forward, a trial court might analyze an
enforcement activity's Fourth Amendment status by considering:

63.

See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.

64.

Floridav.

65.

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.

66.

Of course, it also protects non-intimate activities, but that is an inherent characteristic of any
prophylactic rule.

67.

Inness refers to it as a "conventionally defined zone in which others cannot do such things as
freely gain access to the agent's body, thoughts, personal information, letters, and so forth."
INNESS, supra note 6o, at 109.

68.

See Nita Farahany, Searching Secrets, 16o U. PA. L. REv. 1239, 1249-53 (2012) (criticizing
"content" versus "no content" approach); Dana Raigrodski, Property, Privacy and Power:
Rethinking the FourthAmendment in the Wake of U.S. v. Jones, 22 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 67, 7891 (2013) (rejecting "public-private dichotomy" between the home and workplace).

Jardines,

170, 18o (1984).

133 S. Ct. 1409,1414 (2013).

27, 37 (2001) ("In the home, . . . all details are intimate
details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.").

69. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor,
added).

J.,

concurring) (emphasis
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1. how comprehensively it generates information regarding an individual
who is the target of such investigative activity; and
2.

the degree of precision with which it has generated that information
regarding a single target or group of targets.

The analysis does not end here. The issue is not simply that the
government's investigative activity generates a "substantial quantum of
intimate information" 7o about an individual, but that it does so in a way that is
wholly unregulated by a "coordinate branch."' Justice Sotomayor's reference
to a "coordinate branch" is curious, as it suggests she is amenable to sources of
oversight other than the "neutral and detached magistrate," who has long
served as the unchallenged hero of the Fourth Amendment canon.72 This more
forgiving language hints at a pragmatic willingness to widen the Fourth
Amendment's regulatory tent.
Finally, as Justice Sotomayor points out, in addition to the lack of
oversight, the secrecy of the government's conduct matters as well.7 1 Secret,
panoramic surveillance undermines democratic ideals by chilling speech and
association.74 Accordingly, a lower court judging a particular type of activity
might also consider:
3. the extent to which the activity in question proceeds surreptitiously and
is regulated by a coordinate branch and therefore more or less prone to
abuse.
Concededly, a framework such as the one above is sure to generate questions
and criticisms. Reasonable people will disagree on terms like
"comprehensiveness" and "precision," and courts still will need to locate the
70.
71.

Id. at 956.
Id.

72.

As Justice Jackson famously observed, the Fourth Amendment's protection resides in the
requirement that inferences of criminality "be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).

73.

The ABA Standards include a provision requiring the government to publicize its frequency
and use of surveillance techniques. ABA Standardsfor Criminal Justice: Law Enforcement
Access to Third Party Records, ABA (2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dai/aba
/publications/criminal justice standards/third partyaccess. authcheckdam.pdf.
See also
SLOBOGIN, supra note 21, at 135. The ABA's standards have been the source of much debate.
See Andrew E. Taslitz, CybersurveillanceWithout Restraint? The Meaning and Social Value of
the Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion Standards in Governmental Access to Third-Party
ElectronicRecords, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 839 (2013).

74.

Jones, 132
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proper "unit" of enforcement activity subject to this test. Do we look at the
single subpoena, a day's worth of surveillance, or the "whole" of the
government's investigation up to a given point in time? However vexatious
these questions may seem in the abstract, there is no reason to believe that
courts cannot answer them, or that the answers the Supreme Court and lower
courts generate will leave us in a worse position than the one we appear to have
reached under Katz.
III. AN EXAMPLE: THE WHITE-COLLAR PROBLEM IN FOURTH
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS

If the opinions issued in Jones should have struck fear in the heart of
anyone, it was that of the white-collar criminal prosecutor. Imagine the
standard fraud: a Ponzi schemer sells stakes in a fraudulent real estate scheme,
and over the years, he sends his dupes quarterly statements purporting to tell
them how well their investment is faring. During that time, he pockets their
money, spends a fair amount of it on fancy clothing and restaurants, and feeds
his growing gambling problem.
How does a prosecutor build a case against this schemer? How too does she
determine if the schemer is acting on his own or working in concert with
others? Presumably, at a bare minimum, she serves a grand jury subpoena on
the schemer's local bank, his credit card issuers, and the local telephone
company. Oft-criticized cases decided decades ago, such as Smith,7 s Miller,'6
and Schultz,' place this information easily within her grasp, regardless of
whether she has "probable cause" or even "reasonable suspicion" that the
defendant has committed any crime."
How, then, might a privacy-as-intimacy framework treat the average
white-collar case? Would a prosecutor suddenly find herself unable to assemble
the evidence necessary to secure an arrest warrant? Viewed from the opposite
perspective, would application of this new test still leave individuals prone to
the very types of intrusions Justice Sotomayor viewed as potentially abusive in
Jones?
Recall the framework: a district court applying a privacy-as-intimacy test
might first consider the comprehensiveness of the government activity in
75.

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)-

76.

United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).

77.

Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).

78.

Stuntz, supra note 27, at 86o (" [J]f the government is to regulate business and political
affairs -the usual stuff of white-collar criminal law-it must have the power to subpoena

witnesses and documents before it knows whether those witnesses and documents will yield
incriminating evidence. This point holds true for a large slice of the activities the
government regulates.").
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question; she might then go on to consider its precision, including the extent to
which it threatens to dredge up intimate details of the target's life; finally, she
should also consider whether the activity has been performed surreptitiously, as
well as its corresponding lack of oversight by coordinate branches and
consequent risk for abuse. Does a standard grand jury subpoena served on
JPMorgan Chase for several months' worth of historical bank records - or even
a series of subpoenas, if we define the unit of enforcement activity
expansively- transgress society's reasonable expectation of privacy-asintimacy?
Admittedly, the answer likely depends on one's baseline. Compared to
extended twenty-four-hour GPS monitoring, the grand jury subpoena for
historical information seems rather tame. Subpoenas seeking several months'
worth of banking or credit card records provide far less comprehensive
information than around-the-clock surveillance. We may become aware of
disparate acts that one may deem "intimate," but we are not as likely to
penetrate a person's "zone" of intimacy as we would be if we watched that
person intently for twenty-four hours a day, weeks at a time.
Grand jury subpoenas also may provide "precise" information in some
instances, but surely not in all. As for likelihood of abuse, the grand jury
subpoena- although not particularly difficult to obtain or serve-offers
marginally more oversight than the purely discretionary and surreptitious
investigatory program. 79 Accordingly, under a privacy-as-intimacy test, the
grand jury subpoena seeking historical records arguably falls on the "nonsearch" side of a revised Fourth Amendment privacy test. It may well disclose
the name of the target's doctor (if, for example, she paid her doctor by check),
or the restaurant where she ate dinner with her family (if she paid with her
bank's debit card). Still, the information collected is not so comprehensive and
precise that we would conclude that a government agent has penetrated the
target's veil of intimacy outside the home.
Privacy scholars likely would disagree with the foregoing analysis,so and
perceive it cynically as the replacement of an old ineffective test with an equally
bad one. Moreover, they might argue that this multi-pronged analysis invokes
exactly that level of uncertainty Justice Scalia sought to avoid when he declined
to parse the information obtained from a thermal imager in Kyllo v. United
States." The locus of the search in Kyllo, however, permitted Justice Scalia this

79. Nevertheless, the legal standard for serving and enforcing a subpoena is admittedly quite
generous. See, e.g., SLOBOGIN, supra note 21, at 18o (summarizing requirements for, and
types of, subpoenas).
8o. Professor Henderson, for example, pronounces
"Orwellian." See Henderson, supra note 1o, at 456.
81.
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Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV. L. REv. F. 262, 268 (2013) (noting that Justice Scalia
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luxury, as the thermal imager was aimed at a home. Outside the home,
however, bright-line rules are far more likely to yield either to standards or
multi-pronged tests. Moreover, even those most skeptical of government
power should welcome the emergence of a privacy-as-intimacy test. It would
do away with the privacy-as-secrecy rubric and, with the guideposts suggested
by Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in Jones, it would focus the judiciary's
energies on those law enforcement activities that trigger the most alarm:
dragnets that surreptitiously detect massive amounts of information with little
to no oversight; extended surveillance of individuals as they go about their
daily activities; and under-supervised use of cooperating informants and
undercover agents, whose prolonged interaction with targets and their families
all but assure the disclosure of intimate information. These are the very
activities that are least regulated, most likely to convey comprehensive intimate
information about our daily lives, and most susceptible of abuse.
At the same time, this middle-ground test would best ensure the
prosecution's access to those potent but more limited law enforcement devices
that Professor William Stuntz long ago declared necessary in order to
commence investigation of difficult-to-prove frauds." Although the Fourth
Amendment presumptively requires a warrant and probable cause for
"searches," it does not go so far as to regulate all aspects of a criminal
investigation.
Technology follows no ideology; it can cause as much harm in the
criminal's hands as it can in the hands of the police. It would be the ultimate
irony if, in attempting to protect itself from "big government," the Court left
society more vulnerable to the corporate criminal. If Fourth Amendment law is,
as Professor Kerr has argued, a form of "equilibrium-adjustment," it would be
a shame for the Court to adjust its jurisprudence in a direction that leaves the
populace prone to more, and not less, harm. 'I

"thought the Court had neither the qualifications nor the authority to determine what is and
is not 'intimate,"' citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38-39 (2001), which reasoned
that a rule premised on whether technology reveals "intimate details" would be "impractical
in application" as it would offer police little ability to predict in advance whether a given law
enforcement technique constituted a Fourth Amendment search).
82.

Stuntz, supra note 27, at 859-60.

83.

Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the FourthAmendment,
476 (2011).
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CONCLUSION

In recent times, the Supreme Court has been criticized for its "proliferation
of separate opinions,""4 as they allegedly confuse the populace and weaken the
rule of law."s But Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in Jones demonstrates their
potential long-term value.1 6 She embraces the majority's view that physical
intrusions on property implicate the Fourth Amendment, but then uses her
concurrence to express the emerging consensus that the reasonable expectation
of privacy and third-party doctrines have outlived their usefulness. Drawing on
the common-sense outlook that resonates with both legal and lay audiences,
she has laid a foundation upon which later courts may develop a more fulsome
conception of privacy and a workable framework for protecting it.
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